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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BOWERS, LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
A MEETING OF HARD AND VERY HARD CASES

VINCENT J. SAMAR*
In this article, I intend to point out how two United States Supreme Court
cases and one state supreme court case have impacted our understanding of
legal judgments in the area of sexual orientation and the law. The point of my
analysis will be to show that the social and cultural contexts in which these
cases are situated requires courts to move higher up a ladder of increasing
abstraction, ultimately terminating in a broad-based concern for human rights.
Taken together, these three cases first illustrate this result by delineating an
important crossroads between two important jurisprudential divides. Once this
is accomplished, these cases will illustrate the need for bridging the gap
between the divides, although they do not directly offer the intellectual
apparatus to do this. For purposes of this article, that apparatus can only be
suggested.
The two jurisprudential divides are, on one hand, the so-called “hard”
cases and, on the other hand, what I shall call the “very hard” cases. The
former, the “hard” cases, are cases where no rule of law presents a specific
legal answer to a particular case, but the background principles underlying the
political morality of the society do. Usually, this is because the principles
differ in weight, and courts are directed to follow the more weighty principle.
The latter, the “very hard” cases, are cases where the background political
morality is itself in dispute and the key is to appeal to some broader, more
general political morality to try to resolve the dispute.
An example of a “hard” case is Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986.1
Two examples of “very hard” cases are Lawrence v. Texas2 and Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,3 both decided in 2003. Together these three
cases represent an important jurisprudential crossroads between theories of law
and political morality generally. Lawrence is particularly interesting in this
* Vincent J. Samar is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Illinois Institute of Technology, ChicagoKent College of Law, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago
and Oakton Community College. He is taking an LLM at Harvard Law School during the 200405 academic year.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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regard and will be addressed last because it points to a clear place where the
road divides. The fact that all three cases concern sexual orientation and the
law illustrates that such cases are profoundly interesting not only in the way
they search out and challenge long-standing viewpoints about human sexuality
and gender, but also in the way they force us to rethink our understandings of
what courts should do when faced with difficult cases.
These cases make us confront the fact that long-standing categories in
which legal cases fall are as much a product of political philosophy as they are
about principles and rules. The fact political philosophy should enter into the
picture at all means that the hope remains for rational discourse and debate to
ultimately usurp extreme prejudices and narrow viewpoints. Exactly why this
happens, however, may not always be clear, especially (and perhaps not
always desirably) when courts have to backtrack from what previously seemed
to be settled positions, turning the whole judicial decision making process on
its side. Understanding the reason courts do this should nevertheless provide
this insight. This will require a brief digression into the legal basis of the three
decisions mentioned above, which will show not only where the departure is
found between what the law is and what it ought to be, but why the latter has a
normative connection to the former in making sense of the duty to obey the
law. It is also my hope that by pointing out the crossroads of the two
jurisprudential divides, I will be able to show the salience gay rights cases have
to our more general understanding of the nature of legal judgment.
In effect, the arguments presented here will implicate broader human rights
concerns about sexual orientation in general. These arguments will suggest
why sexual orientation issues may not be simply reduced to the jurisprudence
of a single legal system, especially a system that claims to find its foundation
in democratic theory. More specifically, in a legal system such as ours, the
duty to obey the law is normally connected to the both the legislature’s
responsibility to provide for the common good and the court’s responsibility to
do justice.4 However, when this does not happen, or fails to happen for certain
groups of people, a closer look at the surface topology of the language is
required to determine what principles of morality are really at stake.
The choice of the three cases I mentioned helps to guide us in just this
way. The significance of each will point out a failure and a redirection in legal
reasoning that can open doors to a greater appreciation of human rights in the
American constitutional context. To show this I will demonstrate that when
Bowers was decided, it should have been no more than a “hard” case with a
different outcome because of the then-prevailing political morality of our
society. In contrast, its language notwithstanding, Lawrence is a much harder
case, as the background political morality that was available but not taken
4. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 6 (1955).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

BOWERS, LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

91

advantage of in Bowers could no longer provide the same solution. Thus, a
new approach is now necessary. A fortiori, Goodridge is a case that motivates
a search for a still more abstract and deeper background political morality in
light of the societal debate over the moral and legal legitimacy of same-sex
marriage. Before I can be any more explicit about these matters, I need to say
something more about what I mean by the appellations “hard” and “very hard”
in context to these cases.
The book Justifying Judgment: Practicing Law and Philosophy deals with
the issue of resolving legal cases where the law is unclear and where there are
varying degrees of controversy over what legally should be done. Because I
believe that the arguments in that book will be useful in clarifying what was
occurring in the above-mentioned cases, permit me to begin by quoting a small
portion of that book’s preface as an introduction to the forthcoming discussion
of the case law:
Ever since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously in
1977 lawyers have been discussing ‘hard cases.’ The precedents in hard cases
go in both directions, and no clear legal rules apply. One suggestion for
deciding these cases has appealed to broader substantive principles of society’s
political morality. By ‘political morality’ I mean the application of morality to
the operation and justification of political institutions. The problem with this
suggestion, however, is that it presupposes that a judge is not faced with
having to decide a case in which the society’s political morality is internally
inconsistent or under serious attack from some alternative political morality.
[This was true, for example, in our own history in the 18th century, when the
political morality that supported slavery came under attack by the abolitionist
movement.] The alternative political morality [in that case the morality of the
abolitionists] may be the position of some substantial portion of society, or it
may be some ideal that seems to the judge to be more persuasive [than the
dominant moral viewpoint]. Either way, when the alternative occurs, the judge
is faced with a very hard case [because now there is no clear principle of law
or social morality that gives the judge a correct way to decide which way the
case should go].5

I. WHY BOWERS V. HARDWICK WAS, AT MOST, A “HARD” CASE
Bowers v. Hardwick involved the unchallenged legal entry of a Georgia
police officer into the home of Michel Hardwick on the evening of August 3,
1982.6 There the officer found Michael Hardwick and another adult male
engaged in an act of oral sodomy in Michael’s bedroom.7 Michael was
5. VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, at ix
(1998).
6. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
7. Id. at 187.
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subsequently charged with violating section 16-6-2 of the Georgia Code, a
statute that made it a crime to engage in sodomy with another, even in the
privacy of one’s home,8 and was punishable by not less than one and up to
twenty years in prison.9 The Georgia statute stated that “[a] person commits
the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”10
The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Georgia sodomy statute
was challenged on due process and privacy grounds.11
The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, distinguished the portion of
the statute pertaining to homosexual sodomy from the remainder of the act,
which also included heterosexual sodomy.12 Specifically, the Court, referring
to the portion of the statute making homosexual sodomy a crime, ruled, per
Justice White, that prior case law did not put adult consensual homosexual
sodomy in the home beyond state proscription.13 The basis of the Court’s
rationale was that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other [was] . . .
demonstrated.”14 Nor did the cases protect any form of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults.15 Thus, Bowers was a “hard” case.
While there were no prior privacy cases directly on point, the Court
already had within its established constitutional privacy jurisprudence a set of
principles that should have guided the Court to decide the case very differently
from the way it ultimately did. This suggests a prejudice against homosexuals
on the part of some of the justices who participated in the decision. Indeed,
this was particularly clear from Justice Burger’s concurring opinion where he
said: “Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in the Judeao-Christian moral
and ethical standards.”16 The set of privacy principles that should have
decided this case, and no doubt would have had the prejudices suggested by

8. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
9. Id. § 16-6-2(b).
10. Id. § 16-6-2(a).
11. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 196 n.8 (in Bowers an equal protection challenge was not
raised).
12. See id. at 190 (clarifying that the Court’s ruling dealt only with “whether the Federal
Constitution [sic] confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” even
though the statute did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy).
13. See id. at 190-91.
14. Id. at 191.
15. See id.
16. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
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the above-quoted passages not existed, have their foundation in three different
areas of the law: Fourth Amendment, tort, and constitutional privacy.
A.

The Fourth Amendment

In the Fourth Amendment area, the right to privacy protects persons,
information, and places against unreasonable searches and seizures.17 What
makes a search unreasonable is the presence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy coupled with the absence of a warrant based on probable cause that a
crime was about to take place.18 This right to privacy of information and
places was specifically directed against the government, limiting its pursuit of
a criminal investigation from becoming a mere fishing expedition of possible
criminal activity.19 A perhaps now antiquated example of this rule would be
the person in the glass-enclosed telephone booth who had a reasonable
expectation of not being overheard, but no such expectation of not being
seen.20
B.

Tort

In contrast to the Fourth Amendment right to privacy was the development
of the privacy tort in civil law. Here the issue, as described in a famous law
review article at the turn of the last century, was protecting against
unreasonable invasions into personal affairs by the press and other persons.21
Prosser describes this tort as involving four separate concerns:
 Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
 Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
 Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
 Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of plaintiff’s name or
likeness.22
Similar to the Fourth Amendment area, the civil law privacy tort was to
serve as a protection of information and places. However, this tort is directed
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-28 (1991).
18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the zone of
privacy extends as far as a court would consider a reasonable person to expect).
19. See generally id. at 357.
20. See id. at 352 (government-placed wire tap captured petitioner’s calls from inside glassenclosed telephone booth).
21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195-97 (1890).
22. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
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against other persons rather than the government.23 In this way, privacy
became more than just a protection against certain governmental intrusions, but
also a safeguard of individual personhood and autonomy from the prying eyes
of others.24
C. Constitutional Privacy
The Fourth Amendment right to privacy and the privacy tort were not the
only sources of privacy protection that had been recognized prior to the
Court’s decision in Bowers. Beginning in the 1960s with Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court began to set out constitutional privacy law
jurisprudence based on a liberty right.25 In Griswold, the Court upheld the
constitutional privacy rights of a married couple to use contraceptives and of
physicians to advise their use against a state law that prohibited both.26 In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended that right to include unmarried
persons.27 In Carey v. Population Services International, the Court extended
the right still further, striking down a law which made it a crime to distribute
contraceptives to minors.28 In Roe v. Wade, the Court extended constitutional
privacy protections to a mother’s choice to have an abortion, noting that the
fetus was not a person under the law.29
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area was not confined to
physical activity that was arguably self-regarding.30 The Court had also
upheld, in Stanley v. Georgia, the right of a person to possess “obscene matter”
in the privacy of his home.31 In that case, the Court stated:
This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is
fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case—a
prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a
person’s own home—that right takes on an added dimension. For also
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.32

D. Application to Bowers

23. See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892,
1894-96 (1981).
24. See id. at 1896-97.
25. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring).
27. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
28. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977).
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 158 (1973).
30. See SAMAR, supra note 17, at 65-68.
31. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
32. Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
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Despite all the precedent that might have suggested the contrary, the
Bowers Court refused to find constitutional privacy protection for two
consenting adults to engage in same-sex sodomy in the home.33 Prior to
Bowers, two cases, one a New York court of appeals case, People v. Onofre,34
and the other a Virginia federal district court case, Doe v. Commonwealth’s
Attorney,35 had gone in opposite directions on whether a fundamental right to
privacy covers and protects such activities. Bowers was not a “very hard” case
because the Court had enough of an indication of society’s political morality
from its own past privacy decisions to render a decision against such statutes,
even though it chose not to do so. Consequently, at the point when the Court
heard Bowers, constitutional jurisprudence had already been sufficiently
developed to afford protection to Michael Hardwick.36 Still, if there was any
question about this matter, it could have been reasoned as follows:
A mere description of the action involved in Bowers does not impinge the
basic interest of any other person in the relevant group of actors. The Court
should have first acknowledged this, and then if it so thought, said what the
basis was for any derivative interest trumping privacy. The Court did none of
this, and that failure more than even its conclusion marks this case as a
particularly notorious departure from the traditional protection afforded
fundamental human rights.37

The same precursory precedent that was available to the Court in Bowers
was not unconditionally available to the Court’s more recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,38 which overruled Bowers. For reasons to be discussed
below, and notwithstanding the Court’s own language, Lawrence was a “very
hard” case.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE—A CLEARLY “VERY HARD” CASE

33. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
34. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (N.Y. 1980) (holding unconstitutional
statute declaring consensual sodomy or deviate sexual intercourse between persons not married to
each other criminal), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
35. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975) (holding
constitutional statute making private consensual sodomy between adult males a crime), aff’d
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (arguing that the Court’s prior cases have not “construed the
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy,” and that those
cases “were described as dealing with child rearing and education; with family relationships; with
procreation; with marriage; with contraception; and with abortion” (citations omitted)).
37. Vincent J. Samar, Gay-Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human Rights, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 983, 1016 (2001) (footnote omitted).
38. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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The claim that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided is based on the
view that the prior privacy cases cannot be interpreted merely as a concern
about marriage and procreation, as was suggested in Justice White’s majority
opinion in Bowers.39 This is because neither Eisenstadt v. Baird,40 Carey v.
Population Services International,41 nor Roe v. Wade42 specifically dealt with
marriage, and moreover, while Roe is contrary to the protection of procreation,
it does protect the right to make procreative choices. Although one might say
that these earlier cases were distinguishable because they did not deal directly
with the question of state regulation of adult consensual sexual activities such
as fornication, they nevertheless did lay out the predicate for protection of nonprocreative sex among unmarried persons, which is what state regulation of
adult consensual sexual activity concerns.
On the other hand, the majority’s opinion in Bowers was correct in that
these earlier privacy cases did concern the choice to bear children and whether
that choice could be compelled by the state. Bowers only concerns that choice
indirectly because same-sex relationships are not biologically reproductive.
Still, the distinction here appears to be without a difference if the net effect of
the earlier cases is to protect behavior that may not be procreative in nature.
For this reason too, it appears that Bowers is nothing more than a “hard” case,
where a new variation of an old issue had to be decided under the thenprevailing law.
A “very hard” case is one where the correctness of society’s political
morality is itself in doubt. Take, for example, the situation of same-sex
marriage. At stake in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health43 was the question of the moral
legitimacy of same-sex marriage, over which our society is very divided. The
issue in that case was not whether marriage is a fundamental right; that was
decided in Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923,44 and repeated again in Skinner v.
Oklahoma in 1942.45 Nor was it undecided whether miscegenation statutes
were unconstitutional; that was decided in Loving v. Virginia in 1967.46 What
our society is divided over is whether the right to marry includes the right to
marry someone of the same sex. This is evident from recent legislative

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Skinner v. Ok., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

BOWERS, LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

97

reactions to the possibility of same-sex marriage47 and from various public
opinion polls.48 Indeed, every argument, from the analytical argument that the
institution of marriage is defined to be between opposite-sex partners49 to the
normative argument that state support of marriage exists primarily to
encourage the procreation of children,50 has been used to try to justify the
prohibition of same-sex marriage. Singer v. Hara, a 1974 case from the State
of Washington, provides a good example of these two arguments being used in
tandem against an attempt to argue that prohibitions against same-sex marriage
violate the U.S. Constitution.51
However, if the state’s normative argument is merely that marriage is
defined to include only opposite-sex couples, then the state has begged the
question by simply constructing into the definition of marriage, without
argument, the very thing it has sought to prohibit; namely, gay and lesbian
marriage. This is an analytical move that is completely blind to why the state
might afford a right to marry at all. Marriage is, after all, not a “natural kind”
containing a unique set of natural constitutives.52 Rather, it is a social
construction designed to further certain social goals of society.53 Following
this line of thought, if it is the state’s position that marriage exists for the sole
purpose of supporting procreation, then the state’s position is weak by being
focused exclusively on procreation, as opposed to other normative values like
stability and self-fulfillment that the state may also value. This is made clear
by the fact that state marriage laws allow heterosexuals to marry who do not
intend (and in some cases could not) have children and do not want to adopt
children.54
On the other hand, if the right to marry is of value only to take advantage
of certain benefits that accrue through marriage (such as the ability to file a
joint income tax return, having automatic rights of inheritance, or rights to
make health and property decisions for a spouse), that too is a weak argument
47. Bill Walsh, Demos Fear Fallout of Gay Nuptials Question; Some Say Wedge Issue on
Ballot Helps Republican Candidates, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 23, 2004, at 20; Fred Barnes, How
Many Gays Do You Know?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A14.
48. Fred Bayles, Same-Sex Marriage Begins in Mass.: Gay Couples Line Up to Apply for
Licenses, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004, at 1A (showing 55% of Americans opposed to same-sex
marriage, down from 65% last December).
49. Dean v. D.C., 653 A. 2d 307, 315-16 (D.C. 1995).
50. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 461-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
51. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
52. See generally W.V. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 114 (1969) (discussing the philosophical doctrine of “natural kinds”).
53. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1434,
1485 (1993).
54. See Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and
Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2002).
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for same-sex marriage.55 That is to say, there may be alternative ways to
provide these benefits, such as the civil unions that exist in the State of
Vermont.56 In that case, the most one might hope to say—adopting for the
moment a utilitarian approach—is that it is for the greatest good of the greatest
number to allow lesbians and gays to unionize and heterosexuals to marry. But
then the resolution of the marriage question is strictly dependent on a
cost/benefit analysis of how much of a benefit to how many different people is
served by allowing gays and lesbians to unionize but not marry. In this
situation, the benefit is going to be the upholding of certain social
biases/prejudices regarding who can marry; it is no better than the biased-based
white supremacy justification implicit in the Virginia miscegenation statute
struck down in Loving v. Virginia.57 As an aside, there may be many economic
benefits resulting from allowing same-sex marriage in the form of renting
spaces for wedding receptions, buying flowers and presents, renting apparel,
hiring bands, and going on honeymoons.
Nevertheless, because utility may not protect against bias and prejudice in
the short run, whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to legally marry
must depend on whether denying such a right is a violation of fundamental
fairness, just as separate but equal education was found to be fundamentally
unfair to African-Americans attending public schools.58 Therefore, same-sex
marriage seems to provide a good example of a “very hard” case, especially
when it is recognized that appealing to society’s existing political morality will
not likely resolve the problem. But, then, to what should a court appeal to
decide such a case, and how would a court be able to justify whatever choice
of source it settled upon?
It might be questioned why same-sex marriage is not simply a “hard” case
where judges and others may simply not like the result that equal protection
clauses force upon them. The answer is that equal protection clauses are not
all that clear. For example, take the federal Equal Protection Clause, which is
part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.59 When the
amendment was passed, it was designed to remove a certain form of racial
discrimination that was likely to keep former African-American slaves as an
underclass in the former succeeding southern states.60 However, broader
55. See id. at 364-72.
56. See id. at 372-79 (also including possible limitations on such unions). In this regard,
Professor Strasser also explains and critiques domestic partnerships as another alternative route to
marriage. See id. at 380-81.
57. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 2, 7, (1967).
58. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 162
(1998).
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interpretations of the amendment have led to its use as a means for removing
discrimination against politically powerless classes of persons who are
identified by some immutable trait through no fault of their own.61 Would
such an immutable trait include finding happiness by having a recognized legal
relationship with another person of the same sex? That is a question for which
the courts have been uncertain.62
Put another way, what justifies the courts in deciding “easy” cases on a
positivistic interpretation of laws,63 such as laws enacted by the Congress and
signed by the President?64 In “hard” cases, what justifies the courts in
following a more Dworkian-like approach that seeks to protect the integrity of
law by making sure that it conforms to society’s political morality?65 Finally,
what justifies the courts in deciding “very hard” cases following a de novo
natural law/natural rights approach when the society’s political morality is
itself in doubt?66 This is the central question that Justifying Judgment seeks to
unravel, and it is especially poignant in areas concerning sexual orientation and
the law.
III. WHEN RESORTING TO POLITICAL THEORY IS NECESSARY TO DO JUSTICE
Part of the difficulty we have in resolving this problem discussed supra in
Section II is that too often we tend to compartmentalize our thinking of how
courts should operate with such popular expressions as “activist” or
“conservative” court.67 We tend to look at law as either an open or a closed
system, and think that the political responsibility of judges is to either preserve
institutional or background rights.68 What I attempt to show in Justifying
Judgment (and hope to illustrate in this article) is that this
compartmentalization of the law is too static in that it blocks us from seeing

61. See Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions – Fundamental Right to
Travel or “Newcomers” as a Suspect Class? 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1017-20 (1975).
62. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
63. A positivistic interpretation is an interpretation that decides what the law is based on its
having the correct pedigree. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 859 (7th ed. 1999).
64. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-98, 100-09 (2d ed. 1994) (showing that under a
modern positivistic conception, laws affecting behavior, called “primary rules,” take their validity
from conformance to some recognized secondary rule of procedure, the same also being true for
determining the validity of most secondary rules, except for the ultimate secondary rule of
recognition, which exists by mere acceptance).
65. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
66. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 7, 1991,
at 41, 44.
67. See, e.g., Patti Waldmeir, Big Eye on the Little Guy, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 10, 2004,
at 16; Mimi Hall & Andrea Stone, Activists May Use Ruling to Stir up Voters About Values, USA
TODAY, June 27, 2003, at 6A.
68. See SAMAR, supra note 5, at 68-72.
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why we have legal institutions at all. Such institutions serve to allow for a
deeper level of moral reflection that goes beyond the consideration of
individual preferences and allows movement between institutional and
background rights. The former represent the specific rights individuals have
before the law.69 The latter represent a more abstract set of political rights
people are thought to possess in a free society, which, when not guaranteed by
the legislature, ought to be guaranteed by the courts.70
The point is that if courts are to do justice and legislatures are to promote
the common good, more flexibility is needed. This is true whether we take the
judges to be activist or conservative, because any action they take is going to
be shrouded in language concerning their duty to obey law. But from where
would this duty arise? The answer lies in what we take to be the
responsibilities associated with the various practices of governmental
institutions and the particular duties of the governmental actors involved in
those practices to insure that such responsibilities are met.
What is perhaps surprising to learn from a study of legal decisions is not
that there are differences in judicial viewpoints over what the laws entail, as
would be the case, for example, if some judges believe in following original
intent71 while others believe in adopting the law to the changing needs of
society.72 What is both surprising and interesting is that the very concept of
why even a very clearly written law should be followed is not at all obvious
from delineating the legal philosophy of any judge.73 This is because the
question of why the law should be followed is not itself a question of legal
philosophy, but rather of political philosophy.74 By “legal philosophy” I mean
both what is to count as law and when a so-called law should validly be given
effect. The reason why traditional natural law theories appear to answer this
question (as opposed to positivism, legal realism, or even Dworkian legal
idealism where society’s political morality is in doubt) is that such theories
conflate the question of what the law is and why we should obey it. The
question of why one should obey the law is not to be found in the practice of
law itself but in the concern over whether courts should follow unjust laws.
That is to say, it is not a question for judges alone, but for legal academics,

69. See id.
70. The relationship between background and institutional rights is theoretical and is meant
to convey two different ideas about what duties courts have. See id.
71. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (arguing for a framers’ interpretation of the law).
72. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535,
559 (1999) (discussing different theories of constitutional interpretation).
73. See Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law
Field: 1981-1982, 96 F.R.D. 437, 444 (1983).
74. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 13-14, 31-36 (2001).
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political philosophers, and the citizenry at large who seek broader justificatory
grounds before accepting any such dogma-affecting behavior. Judges
operating from within the internal point of view accept a responsibility to
follow the law because they view their society as nearly just, and they obey the
laws until changed by the legislature or through the various methods of
constitutional or legislative interpretation.75 “Very hard” cases, however,
disrupt this neat avoidance of the issue by forcing judges to confront the
question of the justice of the legal system from outside their own point of view.
Marriage, for example, can no longer be assumed to between a man and a
woman because that issue is exactly what is in question. “Very hard” cases
arise when judges confront either internally inconsistent principles or
principles subject to some greater outside challenge as to their justice.
Whenever this happens, judges should be prepared to engage a more open,
reflective process in which the institutional grounds of their own duty to follow
the law can no longer be assumed, but must, at least to some extent, be
justified.
In the broader sense, this means that even in a society that considers itself
to be nearly just, if it does not engage in this reflective process, the laws it
follows will at most be virtual (at least until “very hard” cases are confronted)
in the sense that the courts will assume a duty to obey them without such duty
ever being shown to exist.76 Here, I use the word “law” in the broad sense that
natural law theorists do in order to encompass the outcrop of society’s serious
reflection of how to decide difficult cases. The distinction between internal
and external points of view brings us to the relationship of legal and political
philosophy by making this issue obvious, as it does when courts confront the
question of same-sex marriage. By the same token, the problem with “very
hard” cases is that having made the issue evident, it now needs to be solved if
justice is to be done.
Still, that some cases should be “very hard,” such as Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,77 while others are merely “hard” cases, such as
Bowers v. Hardwick,78 does not say much about what the topography looks
like at the border. For this reason, the last of the three cases I consider is
Lawrence v. Texas,79 which in many respects is similar to Bowers, but in one
important respect is more comparable to Goodridge.
IV. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BORDER

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See SAMAR, supra note 5, at 76-78.
Id. at 96.
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court made up for its prior—now admitted—
mistake in Bowers v. Hardwick by allowing a challenge to the constitutionality
of a Texas sodomy statute that made adult consensual same-sex behavior a
crime, even when performed in private.80 The facts were almost identical to
those in Bowers, except the sodomy concerned anal sex, not oral sex, and there
was a different legal—though still unrelated—reason for the police entry into
the home.81 One very interesting aspect of the case is the fact that it came
down just seventeen years after a similar Georgia statute82 was upheld as
constitutional in Bowers. Another important difference between the two cases
was that the Lawrence Court seemed willing to pay more attention to
extralegal and nonlegal sources.83
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers.84 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy grounded his opinion in several earlier cases, including
Griswold v. Connecticut85 and Roe v. Wade,86 because both recognized a
fundamental privacy interest protected by the Due Process Clause.87
Kennedy’s majority opinion in effect displaced what dissenting Justice Scalia
noted was the previous view of the Court (and, no doubt, was still the view of
himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and probably Justice Thomas), that a
particular practice traditionally viewed as immoral could be “a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”88
Kennedy’s broader due process interpretation in Lawrence may have been
out-of-step with current law, however, if Bowers were still good law. As
Lawrence and Bowers are not logically reconcilable, Bowers’s status as
controlling law had to be overcome. Kennedy dealt with this issue by showing
that Bowers was wrong when decided and remains wrong today.89 It was
necessary for the Court to find that Bowers was wrongly decided because,
under a certain version of positivism, once Bowers was decided, it became part
of the very law that Kennedy had to interpret.90 Indeed, even from the position
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-64. The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence was TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003).
81. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63 (the police entered the home as a result of a reported
weapons disturbance).
82. The statute in question in Bowers was GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
83. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
84. Id. at 578.
85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65.
88. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 566-68.
90. The point here is that if positivism (or legal realism, which holds the view that the “law”
is what the courts say the law is) claims that what the highest court decides is now the law, then
the Supreme Court’s prior determination in Bowers would make that the law of the land.
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of a natural law theorist, Kennedy’s decision would be problematic if Bowers
were deemed morally correct.91
As a ground for overturning Bowers, Kennedy showed that the
suppositions determining that decision—views of Western Civilization towards
homosexuality—were incorrect and inadequate ways of explaining both the
law that preceded it and the law ensuing from it.92 First, Kennedy examined
the history and weak enforcement of sodomy statutes that preceded Bowers.93
Second, he noted that the prior development of the Model Penal Code
disavowed making private, consensual, adult sexual activity criminal.94 Third,
the post-Bowers case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey re-affirmed Roe, and recognized that due process protected the deepseated value in personal autonomy and human dignity.95 Finally, Justice
Kennedy focused on various recent international human rights documents and
decisions affirming privacy and equality rights for gays and lesbians.96
What is striking is that Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence is difficult to fit
into a standard positivist model of law, like that of H.L.A. Hart’s. This
difficulty exists because Hart treats positivism as not only separating law from
morality and providing an analytical analysis of concepts, but also treats it as
establishing formal criteria for determining what the law is.97 In other words,
if a statute or case decision has the correct pedigree, it is the law regardless of
whether we like its content. Kennedy’s view is arguably more consistent with
Dworkin’s model, because Kennedy attempts to balance previously established
principles against those raised in Bowers. However, the Dworkin model
cannot easily explain why the weight of relevant principles may now have
shifted.98 Internal principles, including those directing courts to take account
of society’s changing views, are themselves relative to such change. What
Kennedy did not do was articulate a clear way of answering these questions
within the American constitutional framework. This author believes that
Kennedy’s decision was correct; however, the task of formulating such an
articulation of how to answer these questions within the American
constitutional framework is still incomplete.

91. The issue here is different, as it begs the question of whether or not morality is relative to
changing beliefs.
92. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
93. Id. at 558-71.
94. Id. at 572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
95. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 851 (1992).
96. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
97. See Brian Leiter, Beyond The Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 22 (2003).
98. See id. at 27-28.
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V. TOWARDS A MORE COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL DECISIONMAKING
At this point, I would like to offer an interpretative suggestion about what
courts should do to decide “very hard” cases. This suggestion may explain
Justice Kennedy’s decision as well as provide a predicate for what courts
should do to decide all such cases. My suggestion is to adopt a metatheory99
that tells courts how to pick and choose among competing legal theories. The
justification for adopting such a metatheory, from the judge’s point of view, is
that it will provide a basis for making decisions in “very hard” cases by
answering requisite questions that would otherwise be unanswerable. The
metatheory should also tell judges that in “very hard” cases it is both necessary
and appropriate to go beyond traditional legal theory in pursuit of what I call
the best theory of politics. This is necessary to bring out the duty to obey law
formulated as I have shown as a normative, and not strictly analytical, idea.
With this picture in mind, I want to suggest five criteria that a court could rely
on when deciding “easy,” “hard,” and “very hard” cases:
1. When the traditional sources of law are clear and on point, a judge
should rely on these sources if the society views itself as nearly just,
despite her own views as to the most just result . . . .
2. If the traditional sources of law include past case precedents, then, if
the society is nearly just, a judge should analogize the case and reason
by analogy to bring it under the particular precedent that would
provide the most just result.
3. If the traditional sources of law are not clear or on point and the case
involves a question of economic or social policy as opposed to right or
justice, then, if the society is nearly just, the court should follow an
economic analysis or appropriate policy approach to deciding what
would best serve the common good.
4. When the traditional sources of law are not clear or on point and the
case involves a fundamental question of justice, then if the society is
nearly just, a judge should interpret the traditional legal sources,
considering the society’s prevailing political morality to produce the
most just result.
5. In cases where the society is not nearly just or where the particular
issue is so controversial as not to be resolvable within the society’s

99. A metatheory is “a theory concerned with the investigation, analysis, or description of
theory itself.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED 1421 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. et al. eds., 1993).
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political morality, because the society’s political morality is itself in
question, then, despite whether the law is clear and on point, a judge
has no political responsibility to follow the law. In such a case, the
judge’s responsibility is to act upon the best political theory the court
can find to do justice and, if possible, to create along the way
democratic procedures that will be constitutionally liberal and
concerned for the equal opportunity of all individuals.100
At this point it might be noted that the criteria do not require judges to seek
validation for the legal system in every case, provided that society considers
itself nearly just and the case is no more than a “hard” case.101 This is to avoid
adding unnecessary complexity both to a legal system that is already
overburdened and to the duties of judges who may not be properly trained. It
is also to ensure that some level of justice is done for all who come before the
system. In those few cases that really are “very hard,” the criteria do demand
just this sort of “philosopher-king” effort, and there the added requirement
does seem appropriate. Some examples will help illustrate the theory’s utility.
Utilizing the metatheory and its five criteria of decision making, I am now
in a position to fit the three cases I presented at the beginning of this article
into a broader framework of how the law should operate to resolve each of
them. Bearing in mind that there will be differences depending on whether the
cases are “easy,” “hard,” or “very hard,” here is how each case-type might be
resolved.
I will start with a case-type I have not discussed because it may be thought
to be an “easy” case, namely, the case of a homosexual-bashing. This example
seems to fit the first criterion because the statute in this case, most likely a
battery statute, is clear and there is no serious question of justice at stake in
punishing direct uses of force and violence against a non-threatening person. I
am putting aside here any free speech issue that might arise from the
augmentation of a penalty by simply assuming, for the purposes of the
example, that no such augmentation occurs. The difficult question in this area
is whether augmenting a punishment to target thoughts is a violation of the
First Amendment. There, the question approaches a “hard” case where the
society’s political morality would seem to recognize higher penalties for
premeditation in the criminal law or willful and wanton conduct in the torts
area. In that instance my fourth criterion for decision making, requiring the

100. SAMAR, supra note 5, at 76-77.
101. Here I differ from an earlier aspect of Ronald Dworkin’s work where he would have his
judge fit each decision with every other possible decision he or she subsequently plans to make.
See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 161-62 (1985). Dworkin later relaxed the
requirement a bit to require only putting together a coherent scheme of law within the area in
which the decision is rendered. See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 252-53.
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society’s political morality to rank the value of thought in the context of hatesupported violence, seems appropriate. Further, that decision will no doubt
rekindle an important discussion balancing First Amendment liberty interests
against Fourteenth Amendment equality concerns.
Bowers v. Hardwick102 seemed like it should have been a good fit to the
fourth criterion because the prevailing political morality of society was already
present to resolve a conflict in case precedent. Two important constituents of
that morality (as reflected in the case law) are the separate notions of negative
freedom103 and self-regardingness,104 which seemed evident in the prior
privacy cases.105 These two notions, when put together, should have presented
the Court with the idea of a private act. This idea could have been found to be
present in the Bowers case, but for some unexplained reason the Court declined
to find such a private act.106
Kennedy’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas107 fits my fifth criterion of being
a “very hard” case in which extralegal aspects concerning the duty to obey law
were taken into account but not articulated. Similarly, the decision to legalize
same-sex marriage also fits the fifth criterion because a court must go beyond
society’s political morality by interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to
unravel the institution of marriage itself. Here the issue is not to make the
institution (as it is traditionally construed) available to all people equally, but
to question whether the institution is fairly constituted. Let me elaborate just a
bit.
To deny one class of adult citizens the right to choose whom to marry
(rather than just affording them the right to marry), without a compelling
reason, may undermine the political responsibility courts have to do justice by
affording every human being a right to dignity. At least, this would be an
important broad-based duty-prescribing question for the courts to consider. In
our system, the Equal Protection Clause was designed to avoid past practices

102. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
103. Negative freedom is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. ONLINE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
104. Self-regardingness is where one’s actions do not, in the first instance, affect other then
oneself. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (1988).
105. SAMAR, supra note 17, at 65.
106. See id. at 68, where I offer the definition that “[a]n action is self-regarding (private) with
respect to a group of other actors if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first
instance on the basic interests of the actor and not on the interests of the specified class of actors.”
By “in the first instance” I mean that a mere description of the action, “without the inclusion of
any additional facts or causal theories” does not suggest of a conflict. Id. at 67. By “basic
interest” I mean an “interest independent of conceptions about facts and social conventions.” Id.
107. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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that may, upon reflection, turn out to be unjust.108 As Cass Sunstein has noted,
the clause is forward-looking in just the opposite way that the Due Process
Clause is backward-looking.109 This means that courts are obligated to make
use of the Equal Protection Clause “to invalidate practices that were
widespread at the time of its ratification and were expected to endure.”110 Put
another way, the Clause recognizes that a system of legal rules may not always
be adequate to resolve every case that comes along because the rules
themselves embody certain background prejudices. This suggests that
occasionally it may be necessary for courts to look beyond the political
morality of the society if justice is to be done.
VI. POLITICAL MORALITY
Here it may be appropriate to recognize the likelihood that many people
may feel uneasy with this fifth principle, even with this somewhat narrow
application, because it allows courts to step outside a conventional legal
interpretation of law in search of justice. Undoubtedly, some may wonder
whether this opens the door to judicial anarchy by producing results that
represent the idiosyncratic moral views of the judges, which may be
considered good only when the public shares these virtues but not otherwise.
Obviously this issue is serious. However, the fact that in a few “very hard”
cases judges may need to step outside the prevailing political morality does not
mean, as the other principles attest, that in every case there are good reflective
grounds for doing so. Nor does it mean that law is unprincipled because any
argument outside of what may be thought as traditional legal argument opens
the door to a “nowheresville” of idiosyncratic moral theory.111
The contrary to seeing law as unprincipled is seeing law as following a
doctrine of political responsibility from which we can derive a duty to obey
law. The duty to obey law is based on the state’s political obligation to respect
and advance human dignity.112 Even if there are disagreements over what that
outside doctrine is, it will be a worthwhile effort to determine what it might be.

108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Here I distinguish myself from Richard Posner, who discounts the use of moral theory in
law. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999).
112. My point here is that, at least in a Western-styled democracy, for a legal system to be
morally justified such that a normative duty to obey law can be derived, the legal system must
require respect for individual human autonomy in the sense of upholding individual self-rule.
Failure to respect such autonomy is to undermine at least one important argument for law. See
SAMAR, supra note 17, at 90-103.
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While others may differ on just how to set out this area of political
responsibility—whether to follow, for example, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls,
or some more utilitarian theory—I prefer to look to the writings of Alan
Gewirth who believes that voluntariness and purposiveness are necessary
starting elements for any moral theory113 and, consequently, that these
elements are necessary for any morally justified basis for following law. I
chose to look to Gewirth here because his system provides the best starting
point for grounding rights to freedom and well-being, which our legal system
and society generally seem most concerned to support.114
Here, freedom means that one acts by one’s own unforced choice with
knowledge of relevant circumstances and well-being means that one can act for
purposes of one’s own good.115 Together, these two rights arise out of a
dignity-based notion of individual agency in which everyone affirms their
rights, from their own point of view, of maximizing their own individual selffulfillment.116 Consistent with not conflicting with the equal rights of others,
the government aids the development of human dignity by assisting persons
both individually and collectively in achieving self-fulfillment. Government
serves this purpose by providing protections for basic rights—including the
rights to life and physical and mental integrity—and the right to protect and
secure various means to ensure that one’s purposes are not frustrated—
including the rights to property and to contract. Government further protects
the right to provide opportunities to enhance one’s purpose fulfillment, such as
the rights to a decent standard of living, health care, and education.117 In short,

113. Samar, supra note 37, at 1000 (citing ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 53 (1982)).
114. In their book, authors Beyleveld and Brownsword make the following argument: “(1)
The Legal Enterprise and knowledge of it involves action (2) The concept of action commits an
agent, logically, to the acceptance of a supreme moral principle, the ‘PGC’ [Gewirth’s supreme
principle of morality that holds one should act in accord with the rights to freedom and well being
of one’s recipients as well as oneself] (3) Phenomena of the Legal Enterprise can only be
properly characterized by judging their moral statuses in relation to the PGC.” DERYCK
BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT 33 (1986).
115. Alan Gewirth explains how a reduction in certain “nonsubtractive goods,” such as when
contract rights and rights to property are not enforced to protect against cheating and illicit
takings, leads to a reduction in individual purpose fulfillment, while an increase in certain other
“additive goods” – like rights to education, healthcare, and a decent standard of living – enhances
one’s level of purpose fulfillment. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 55-56 (1982) [hereinafter GERWITH, HUMAN RIGHTS]; see
also ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 54-63 (1978).
116. See GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 55-56; see also GEWIRTH, REASON
AND MORALITY, supra note 115, at 54-63.
117. See GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 55-56; see also GEWIRTH, REASON
AND MORALITY, supra note 115, at 54-63.
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the view protects many of those rights recognized under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United States in 1948.118
Consequently, the idea of human agency (in the moral sense of being a
voluntary purposive actor) is not only at the foundation of moral rights, it is
also at the foundation of our duty to obey law and the courts’ duty to follow
the law. It also can be seen as part and parcel to the protection of human rights
generally and the promotion of fundamental justice.119 Beyond that, it is no
doubt a basis for human dignity that supervenes on human agency by
recognizing that what makes our actions so appealing to us is that they are our
actions.120
In the case of same-sex marriage, the underlying practice that needs to be
unraveled is marriage itself. What is it? Why do we as a society value it to the
point of attaching legal protections to support it? The application of the
broader theory of political morality that I have suggested might be able to
answer these questions. If so, it would be most useful in resolving the issue of
whether same-sex marriage should be legally recognized in the same way as
opposite-sex marriage is recognized. Without going into too much detail on
this narrow issue I would like simply to offer a brief outline for how such an
approach might operate.
The right to marry (especially if it is based on love and commitment) can
easily be seen as grounded in the purposive-fulfillment and dignity that will
result not only for the couple seeking to get married but to all people generally
affected by the marriage, including family members and, in some cases, as
with adoption, the broader society. However, this will only be true if the
freedom to marry and participate in the rights that accompany marriage in our
society are not circumscribed by phony state arguments that either beg the

118. In the Declaration are promoted rights to life, liberty, security; not to be held in slavery
or subject to torture or inhumane treatment; not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or exile; rights to a
fair and public trial, privacy, a presumption of innocence, travel and asylum, to change
nationality, to own property, and to have freedom of thought and worship. The declaration also
affirms certain economic rights including rights to social security, rest and leisure, a decent
standard of living, compulsory primary education, and to participate in the cultural life of the
community. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR
1968, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNFOLDING THE AMERICAN TRADITION 100-05 (1968).
119. Here the notion of justice comes in when, in protecting rights to freedom and well-being,
one also allows for considerations of due process and equal protection to ensure equality of rights
and that no one’s rights are taken away or limited—as in the case of imprisonment—without
adequate justification.
120. “Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only if two objects
cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also differing with respect to their Bproperties.” THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 778 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
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question or have little to do with respecting human dignity.121 When a society
affords the right to marry to members of the same sex, it recognizes the
fundamental dignity of those who choose same-sex marriage by recognizing
that they have the ability to achieve self-fulfillment through the marital
relationship. Society also establishes a precedent for fairness in the
distribution of all such rights. In this sense, broadening the definition of
marriage promotes the ideals of justice in the application as well as in the
protection of substantive rights. Indeed, it is this provision of human dignity
reflected in individual autonomy and fundamental fairness that renders the
outcome in such a case both morally responsible and legally obligatory.
Applying the same moral rights of freedom and well-being to Lawrence v.
Texas,122 a case I earlier described as being on the borderline between a “hard”
and a “very hard” case, Kennedy’s opinion now can be fully understood. Not
only does it undo the mistake previously made in Bowers v. Hardrick123 where
the Court appealed to a kind of particularist morality on an issue that perhaps
society was too indifferent to give much attention to, but it does so on the basis
of recognized human rights principles. These principles have arguably been
part of the law all the time, even if they had not been previously recognized.
Kennedy’s own statement about these principles hints at this connection:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the
European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers
and to today’s case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was
a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual
conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that
he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal
prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid
under the European Convention of Human Rights . . . . Authoritative in all
countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 now),
the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forth was
insubstantial in our Western civilization.124

Moreover, upon reflection brought about by the implications that Bowers
had on the actual lives of gays and lesbians—implications relating to
discrimination in employment, child rearing, and marriage—Justice O’Connor,
in her concurring opinion, was motivated to, if not overrule Bowers, at least
correct its progeny by appealing to equal protection values that give
121. Here I have in mind arguments that beg the question like defining marriage as
relationship between a man and a woman where that is the issue in question, and arguments that
fail to substantiate normative claims like legal marriage exists solely to promote a place for
rearing offspring.
122. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citation omitted).
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substantive meaning (in terms of bringing in freedom and well-being) to
constitutional interpretation.125 Thus, using traditional constitutional language,
but arguably providing it a broader human rights interpretation, the Court (both
Kennedy’s majority opinion and O’Connor’s concurring opinion) alluded to a
higher-ordered grounding in which one can find a rational basis for its
decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
Looking beyond any specific case outcome, and even beyond the possible
interpretive approaches one might take to arrive at their meaning, Bowers,
Goodridge, and Lawrence illustrate the need to search out higher-ordered
moral theories to find a duty to obey law. It is no longer enough to simply
follow what the traditional positivist model of legal analysis affords us. What
we gain from appreciating these cases in all their jurisprudential significance is
that our society is on the verge of a real commitment to the pursuit of justice
and fundamental rights. Where that pursuit takes us is going to be somewhat
uncomfortable for those who do not like to venture into new and uncharted
intellectual territories, for it will mean not always being as certain of what
result one should find based on a simple formula or rule. Still, the pursuit of
that commitment, which was a goal of Justifying Judgment and an inevitable
outcome of recent developments in constitutional law, is something that we
should be prepared to do. Certainly the developing field of sexual orientation
and the law has pointed us in this direction. The only question is: Will we be
prepared and ready to explore?

125. Id. at 582-83 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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